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Abstract. The role of software and its flexibility is becoming more and
more important in todays networks. New emerging paradigms, such as
Software Defined Networking (SDN) and Network Function Virtualiza-
tion (NFV), are changing the rules of the game, shifting the focus on
dynamicity and programmability. Perfectly aligned with this new spirit,
the FP7 UNIFY European project aims at realizing this appealing vision
by applying DevOps concepts to telecom operator networks and sup-
porting the idea of fast network reconfiguration. However, the increased
range of possibilities offered by the DevOps approach comes at the cost
of designing new processes and toolkits to make SDN and NFV a con-
crete opportunity. In this paper we specifically focus on the verification
process as part of the challenging tasks that must be addressed in this
scenario and its fundamental role of automatically checking some desired
network properties before deploying a particular configuration. Our pre-
liminary results confirm the feasibility of the approach and encourage
future efforts in this direction.
Keywords: DevOps, formal verification, service graphs, network func-
tion forwarding graph
1 Introduction
Ultra broadband diffusion, progresses in Information Technologies (IT), tum-
bling hardware costs and a wider and wider availability of open source software
are shaping the evolution of Telecommunications and ICT infrastructures. In
this context, paradigms such as Software Defined Network (SDN) and Network
Function Virtualization (NFV) can be seen as expressions of a systemic trend
called “Softwarization”. Other expressions of the same trend are Cloud, Edge,
and Fog Computing, Cloud Networking, etc. In essence, the disruptive innova-
tion of “Softwarization” stands in the techno-economic feasibility of virtualizing
most (if not all) network and service functions of Telecommunications and ICT
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infrastructures. In this directions, it is argued that future Telecommunications
infrastructures are likely to become highly dynamic, flexible and programmable
production environments of ICT services. A first evaluation of this idea is car-
ried out by the EU FP7 UNIFY4 consortium, which sets out to integrate modern
cloud computing and networking technologies by considering the entire network
as a unified service production environment, spanning the vast networking assets
and data centers of telecom providers. In order to reach a high level of agility
for service innovation, UNIFY has one focus on providing dynamic service pro-
gramming and orchestration, deploying logical service components, namely Vir-
tual Network Functions (VNFs), across multiple network nodes. In particular,
UNIFY architecture follows SDN principles with a logically centralized control
and orchestration plane. Additionally, compute, storage and network abstrac-
tions are combined into a joint programmatic interface referred to as Network
Function Forwarding Graph (NF-FG). An NF-FG defines a selected mapping of
VNFs and their forwarding overlay definition into the virtualized resources pre-
sented by the underlying layer. Current OSS/BSS do not seem to cope with the
requirements posed by this evolution: in fact, the operations of future Telecom-
munications infrastructures will involve the management and control of a myriad
of software processes, rather than closed physical nodes. Thus, another important
goal of UNIFY is the design and development of integrated operations and devel-
opment capabilities under the name of Service Provider-DevOps (SP-DevOps).
In fact, DevOps paradigm, formerly developed for Data Centers (DCs), is getting
momentum as a source of inspiration regarding how to simplify and automate
management processes for future Telecommunications infrastructures.
Among the above challenges, this paper focuses on the UNIFY verification
process (i.e., the definition of methods and techniques to validate a particular
network configuration before deploying it), which can be seen as an essential
task in environments where reconfiguration of services is expected to be trig-
gered very frequently, both in response to user requests and also in case of man-
agement events. Misconfiguration of dynamic network middleboxes5, violation
of specified network policies, or artificial insertion of malicious network func-
tions are just examples of cases that a complete solution must properly handle
in order to preserve network integrity and reliability. For this reason, the work
presented in this paper goes in the direction of verifying complex graph of ser-
vices through an intense modeling activity, targeted at the specific middleboxes
and the network as a whole. We are motivated by the observation that most
existing tools are “Openflow oriented”, i.e. they mostly consider networks with
a controller which installs <match, action> rules on the switches. Alternatively
(and more generically but with the same fundamental limitations), they con-
sider networks with devices that only perform forwarding decisions according to
the packet header, i.e. without taking into account any additional traffic history
information. Works as [6, 5, 9, 11] fall in this category and represent a valuable
efforts in this research area. Our contribution is intended to move a step forward
4 www.fp7-unify.eu
5 In this paper we use the terms VNF and middlebox interchangeably.
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and overcome the above mentioned limitations by extending these works. In this
sense, one important reference is [8], which tackles exactly the same problem and
provides a scalable solution based on an off-the-shelf SMT solver. We experiment
with this approach and further develop it to meet our specific requirements, also
enriching the available VNF models catalog in order to satisfy the demands for
more and more complex service graphs and to validate the approach with differ-
ent kinds of VNFs. We specifically consider the UNIFY use cases, but it is worth
noticing how our work is much general and easily applicable to other scenarios
since it involves very common network functions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce and clarify
how and to which extent the DevOps approach can be applied in a network
operator infrastructure (Section 2). After defining the processes needed to im-
plement this vision, we move on our current approach to formally verify complex
and rapid deployments of network function chains including a variety of middle-
boxes, deployed to augment the set of in-network services the operator is able
to offer to its final customers (Section 3). In order to show our approach is fea-
sible, we provide some preliminary performance evaluation results based on the
extension of the above mentioned tool (Section 4). Section 5 finally concludes
this work by summarizing our contribution and drawing up some possible near
future directions.
2 The SP-DevOps concept
In order to cope with the high service velocity and increased dynamicity en-
abled by UNIFY and comparable SDN/NFV based environments, we consider a
novel management and operation paradigm for Service Providers, called Service
Provider DevOps - SP-DevOps. SP-DevOps is based on the same major underly-
ing principles as identified for DevOps [10]: i) Monitor and validate operational
quality; ii) Develop and test against production-like systems; iii) Deploy with
repeatable, reliable processes; and iv) Amplify feedback loops. While we ac-
knowledge that DevOps has also a crucial cultural dimension (reflected barely
by the feedback loop principle), our work focuses on technical aspects associated
to these principles, which reflect on processes and associated capabilities for
integrated monitoring, verification, and testing software and programmable in-
frastructure. Even if significant parts of the telecommunication networks are fore-
seen to be virtualized in the future, we in [3] identified important characteristics
of telecommunication networks that differ from traditional data centers, i.e.: (i)
higher spatial distribution, as telecom resources are spread over wide areas due to
coverage requirements; (ii) lower levels of redundancy in access and aggregation
networks compared to the massive data centers of typical cloud computing com-
panies; (iii) stronger requirements on high availability and latency in according
to standards and customer expectations. These characteristics pose new chal-
lenges for applying DevOps principles in telecommunications environments [4].
SP-DevOps addresses them with a set of technical processes supporting devel-
oper and operator roles in a virtualized telecom network. Figure 1 illustrates the
4 Serena Spinoso et al.
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Fig. 1: SP-DevOps cycle for UNIFY service creation.
relation between the four SP-DevOps processes and the developer/operator roles
by means of a service creation lifecycle. The four SP-DevOps processes follow
the DevOps principles to meet specific challenges regarding Observability and
Troubleshooting (Principle: Monitor and validate operation quality); Verification
(Principle: Deploy with repeatable, reliable processes); and Development (Prin-
ciple: Develop and test against production-like systems). We also identified three
main roles involved in the processes: two Developer roles, where one is associated
to a classical operator role assembling the service graph for a particular category
of services (the Service Developer), and a second associated to the classical equip-
ment vendor role in actually programming a VNF (the VNF Developer). The role
of the Operator is to ensure that a set of performance indicators associated to a
service are met when the service is deployed on virtual infrastructure within the
domain of a telecom provider. SP-DevOps might not be a new form of DevOps
as such, but it must include solutions that are uniquely tailored for the charac-
teristics of its environment. Consequently, we propose the SP-DevOps Toolkit as
an instantiation of the SP-DevOps concept [7]. The SP-DevOps Toolkit consists
of a set of DevOps solutions that are developed targeting specific research chal-
lenges identified in the UNIFY production environment [4, 3]. Besides scalable
and programmable infrastructure monitoring functions, the toolkit will also pro-
vide modules for deploy-time functional verification of various abstraction levels
of service definition, supporting the three SP-DevOps roles. As in any develop-
ment process, identification of problems early in the service or product livecycle
can significantly reduce times and costs spent on complicated debugging and
troubleshooting processes. In this paper, we focus on verification with respect
to the service definitions and configurations initiated by the Service Developer.
Automated verification functions operating during deploy-time on each layer of
the orchestration and control architecture, facilitate verification as part of each
step in the deployment process, allowing identification of problems early in the
service lifecycle.
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3 The verification process
The SP-DevOps paradigm represents a significant opportunity for service providers
to implement more complex services in their networks and increase the agility
by which a new function (or a chain of) can be automatically configured and
deployed in their infrastructure. However, while the process of inserting and/or
modifying functions throughout the network can be automated with technologies
similar to the ones used for the Cloud Computing scenario [2], great importance
has also to be placed on the design and implementation of automatic tools that
can verify a network configuration on the fly, before it is deployed. For example,
an operator may want to ensure that a given traffic flow is permitted (or not
permitted, due to a policy constraint) from one node to another. Concerning this
last aspect, our verification process is currently based on a verification approach
recently proposed in [8]. In order to achieve high performance, this verification
approach exploits Z3 [1], a state of the art SMT solver, and translates network
scenarios with multiple middleboxes into sets of First Order Logic (FOL) for-
mulas that are then analyzed by Z3. This choice is motivated by the overall
verification tool performance and scalability, which would be hard to achieve
with standard model checking based techniques. In fact, the latter requires time
and memory that usually increase exponentially with the system complexity,
while the SAT-based approach proposed in [8] seems to be less prone to this
problem. The FOL formulas given to Z3 represent the network operating princi-
ples along with the functional behavior of all the VNFs involved in the scenario
being considered. While [8] presents the general ideas of the proposed approach,
not all the details are fully developed, and not all the different situations that
may arise when considering different kinds of VNFs are considered. Here, we
present our preliminary work towards integrating the approach presented in [8]
into a SP-DevOps context like the one of UNIFY. A considerable part of this
work has been about developing models for new VNFs that were not explicitly
considered in [8], and making some first experiments with them.
In our design, the formal verification task is split into multiple sub-tasks, so that
the whole process is simpler and faster. More precisely, at NF-FG deploy time, or
when the graphs undergo modifications in response to higher level events (e.g.,
administration events or user requests), the VNF chains composing the graph
are computed and then, for each of them, a formal model is generated, including
the model of all the involved VNFs. Finally, the verification engine processes
the whole VNF chain model to check the satisfiability of a given property. In
particular, this paper focuses on reachability problems in service graphs, leaving
the verification of other network properties as possible future work. Furthermore,
since we are using abstract models of the real middleboxes, we assume that these
models are correctly defined. This means that we verify abstract models of the
real middleboxes, considering them as faithful representations of the real VNFs.
Verification of possible mismatch between a VNF model and its implementation
is out of scope for the current prototype. For further details about the adopted
formal verification theory and other background concepts, please refer to [8].
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(send(cache, n0, p0, t0) ∧ ¬isInternal(n0)) =⇒ ¬isInCache(p0.url, t0)
∧ p0.proto = HTTP REQ ∧ ∃(t1, n1) | (t1 < t0 ∧ isInternalNode(n1)
∧ recv(n1, cache, p0, t1)), ∀n0, p0, t0
(1a)
(send(cache, n0, p0, t0) ∧ isInternal(n0)) =⇒ isInCache(p0.url, t0)
∧ p0.proto = HTTP RESP ∧ p0.ip src = p1.ip dest ∧ p0.ip dest = p1.ip src∧
∧ ∃(p1, t1) | (t1 < t0 ∧ p1.protocol = HTTP REQ ∧ p1.url = p0.url
∧ recv(n0, cache, p1, t1)), ∀n0, p0, t0
(1b)
isInCache(u0, t0) =⇒ ∃(t1, t2, p1, p2, n1, n1) | (t1 < t2 ∧ t1 < t0 ∧ t2 < t0
∧ recv(n1, cache, p1, t1) ∧ recv(n2, cache, p2, t2) ∧ p1.proto = HTTP REQ
∧ p1.url = u0 ∧ p2.proto = HTTP RESP ∧ p2.url = u0 ∧ isInternal(n2))
∀u0, t0
(1c)
Fig. 2: Web cache model.
3.1 VNFs models
The approach for modeling network function chains proposed in [8] has been
experimented by the authors of [8] with some middlebox types, such as state-
less and stateful firewalls. When modelling scenarios that include VNFs that
may alter packets (e.g. a NAT), it is necessary to also consider the possibility
for a target VNF to receive a packet different from the one originally trans-
mitted. This kind of situation regards a significant set of middleboxes that is
currently deployed in SP networks and that is envisioned to be included in the
NF-FG within the UNIFY project, e.g. NAT, VPN gateway and so on. We re-
visited the network constraints developed by the authors of [8], by introducing
the possibility of verifying reachability properties between two network nodes
and intermediate VNFs that do modify forwarded packet headers. Finally, we
checked that verification works as expected with these revisited constraints, by
experimenting with the new middlebox models that we developed.
The first VNF we consider is a simple web cache (reported in Figure 2). The
functional model consists of two interfaces connected respectively to the private
network, i.e., the one which contains the clients issuing HTTP requests, and
the external network. Formula 1a states that a packet sent from the cache to a
node belonging to the external network, implies a previous packet, containing
a HTTP request and received from an internal node, which cannot be served
by the cache (otherwise the request would have not been forwarded towards
the external network). Formula 1b states that a packet sent from the cache to
the internal network contains a HTTP RESPONSE for an URL which was in cache
when the request has been received. We also state that the packet received from
the internal network is a HTTP REQUEST and the target URL is the same as the
response. The final formula expresses a constraint that the isInCache() function
must respect. In particular, we state that a given URL (u0) is in cache at time t0
if (and only if) a request packet was received at time t1 (where t1 < t0) for that
URL and a subsequent packet was received at time t2 (where t2 < t0 ∧ t2 > t1)
carrying the corresponding HTTP RESPONSE.
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(send(nat, n0, p0, t0) ∧ ¬isPrivateAddress(p0.ip dest)) =⇒ p0.ip src = ip nat
∧ ∃(n1, p1, t1) | (t1 < t0 ∧ recv(n1, nat, p1, t1) ∧ isPrivateAddress(p1.ip src)
∧ p1.origin = p0.origin ∧ p1.ip dest = p0.ip dest ∧ p1.seq no = p0.seq no
∧ p1.proto = p0.proto ∧ p1.email from = p0.email from ∧ p1.url = p0.url)
∀n0, p0, t0
(2a)
(send(nat, n0, p0, t0) ∧ isPrivateAddress(p0.ipdest)) =⇒ ¬isPrivateAddress(p0.ip src)
∧ ∃(n1, p1, t1) | (t1 < t0 ∧ recv(n1, nat, p1, t1) ∧ ¬isPrivateAddress(p1.ip src)
∧ p1.ip dest = ip nat ∧ p1.ip src = p0.ip src ∧ p1.origin = p0.origin
∧ p1.seq no = p0.seq no ∧ p1.proto = p0.proto ∧ p1.email from = p0.email from
∧ p1.url = p0.url) ∧ ∃(n2, p2, t2) | (t2 < t1 ∧ recv(n2, nat, p2, t2)
∧ isPrivateAddress(p2.ip src) ∧ p2.ip dest = p1.ip src ∧ p2.ip dest = p0.ip src
∧ p2.ip src = p0.ip dest), ∀n0, p0, t0
(2b)
Fig. 3: NAT model.
The second middlebox we modeled is the NAT function. The corresponding
model is reported in Figure 3. In order to model the NAT behaviour, a dis-
tinction between the private and external network is needed. This separation is
modeled by using a boolean function (isPrivateAddress()) that returns true if
a given IP address belongs to the set of internal node addresses. Analyzing the
reported formulas, we start by considering an internal node which initiates a
communication with an external node (Formula 2a). In this case, the NAT sends
a packet (p0) to an external IP address, if and only if it has previously received a
packet (p1) from an internal node. The received and sent packets must be equal
for all fields, except for the ip src, which must be equal to the NAT public IP
address.
On the other hand, the traffic in the opposite direction (from the external net-
work to the private) is modeled by the Formula 2b. In this case, we state that if
the NAT is sending a packet to an internal address, this packet (p0) must have
an external IP address as its source. Moreover, p0 must be preceded by another
packet (p1 in the formula), which is, in turn, received by the NAT and it is equal
to p0 for all the other fields. It is worth noting that, generally, a communication
between internal and external nodes cannot be started by the external node in
presence of a NAT. As a consequence, this condition is expressed in the For-
mula 2b by imposing that p1 must be preceded by another packet p2, sent to the
NAT from an internal node.
4 Preliminary results
In order to evaluate the new developed models and the overall approach, we con-
sider the NF-FG6 shown in Figure 4 as a use case. In our reference graph, four
end-hosts (two clients and two servers) can generate either HTTP or POP3 and
6 We do not provide the firewall VNF model as it was presented as use case in [8].
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Web Client – Web Cache – NAT – ACL firewall – Web Server
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Mail Client – Anti-spam – NAT – ACL firewall – Mail Server
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Fig. 4: An example of Network Function-Forwarding Graph.
also SMTP traffic, which is processed by different middleboxes when traversing
the graph. Moreover, some of those network functions may require a different
configuration. Specifically, the NAT must be configured in order to know which
hosts belong to the private network (as the web cache) and which IP address
must be used as masquerading address; the firewall must be provided with a set
of ACL entries that specify which couples of nodes are authorized to exchange
traffic. Additionally, the forwarding is configured such that the web traffic is
forwarded to the web cache, while the email traffic (both POP3 and SMTP) is
routed to an anti-spam function. A first step towards the NF-FG verification is
the VNF chains extraction. In our use case, two chains are extracted from the
NF-FG (Figure 4): the Chain A processes the web traffic, while the Chain B is
traversed by POP3 and SMTP packets.
We perform multiple tests on the two chains to cover different cases and configu-
ration options: (i) anti-spam and firewall configurations and (ii) traffic directions
(from client to server and vice-versa). Concerning the Chain A, only the ACL
firewall can be configured, hence we setup two tests: one with the firewall con-
figured to allow all the traffic (test A.1) and the other one with the firewall
configured to drop all packets exchanged between the web client and server (test
A.2).
Instead the Chain B is tested in three scenarios, obtained by changing the fire-
wall and anti-spam configurations as follows: (i) test B.1, similarly to test A.1,
is performed without any function configured to drop the received traffic; (ii)
in test B.2, the firewall drops the traffic between the mail client and server
(Figure 5); (iii) test B.3 is such that the anti-spam is configured to drop all the
emails sent by the mail client, while the traffic originated by the server is allowed
(Figure 5). Our evaluation is executed on a workstation with 32GB of RAM and
an Intel i7-3770 CPU running an Ubuntu 14.04.01 with kernel 3.13.0-24-generic.
The results are shown in Figure 5, where the verification time is reported for
each presented scenario.
In test A.1 the reachability problem from the client to the server (the light grey
colored bar in Figure 5) is satisfied as expected. It is worth noting that the un-
satisfiability of the problem in the opposite direction (the dark grey colored bar
VNF graphs formal verification 9
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Fig. 5: Test {A, B}.1: firewall and anti-spam configured to accept packets;
Test {A, B}.2: firewall configured to drop server/client packets; Test B.3:
anti-spam configured to drop server/client packets.
in Figure 5) is due to the fact that client and server can exchange traffic only
if the connection is initiated by the client. In test A.2, in both cases the reach-
ability problems are not satisfied because of the firewall VNF configuration. In
test B.1, the verification problem is satisfiable in case of traffic sent by the mail
client, while the reachability property is not verified for the traffic sent by the
mail server for the above-mentioned reasons.
As it can be seen from the achieved results, performance is promising also in
the worst case scenario, since we are able to solve the reachability problem in
less than 200ms, while the verification time is less than 50ms in most cases.
This is reasonably in line with the UNIFY requirements, especially in terms of
time required by the verification process to authorize a newly asked network
reconfiguration.
5 Conclusion
It is argued that in the future Telecommunications infrastructures are likely to
become highly dynamic, flexible and programmable production environments ca-
pable of providing any ICT services. Future operations will involve the manage-
ment and control of a myriad of software processes, rather than closed physical
nodes.
In fact, today most SPs still have rather complicated and static operational
processes. DevOps, formerly developed for managing Data Centers (DCs), is
attracting a growing interests as a paradigm to be extended to future Telecom-
munications infrastructures. Nevertheless, it is argued that the DevOps will jump
ahead current ossification only if it will be sustainable from a business viewpoint
(CAPEX, OPEX saving are not enough): importantly DevOps criteria of success
depend on how closely the related future infrastructures (e.g. UNIFY) will be
capable of enabling new service paradigms for SP’s (e.g., Immersive Communi-
cations, Anything as a Service, etc). Motivated by these considerations, in this
paper we presented our initial contribution related to the verification process on
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service graphs, which is one of the most important pillars in the SP-DevOps feed-
back cycle. After generalizing the applicability of a state of the art approach to
the verification of complex network graph, we presented and discussed a couple
of models we developed to validate our key ideas. Given the promising evalua-
tion results achieved, we plan to address more efforts to some open topics in the
middlebox verification area such as scalability issues in verifying complex service
graphs and significant opportunities to optimize the verification process when
incremental service graph modifications come into play.
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